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Abstract 
Each time an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) 
is used in the sea there is a non-zero probability of 
loss. Quantifying probability of loss is not an exact 
science; therefore much depends on the fault history 
of the vehicle,  the operational  environment  and the 
complex  relationships  between  the  consequences  of 
faults  or  incidents  and  the  environment.  While  this 
problem may be stated in scientific terms, in practice, 
there is no solution  through scientific means alone. 
This is an example of ‘trans-science’. We suggest that 
an approach based on the formal process of eliciting 
expert  judgement  may  be  an  effective  means  of 
approaching  this  problem,  as  the  process  has  been 
used successfully for other trans-scientific questions. 
The paper provides an introduction to the process of 
eliciting  expert  judgement,  outlines  four  exemplar 
environments: coastal, open water, under sea ice and 
under shelf ice, and gives a worked example of one 
expert’s judgement on the probability of loss in the 
four environments arising from a real fault with the 
Autosub1  AUV.  Using  the  fault  history  of  the 
Autosub3  AUV,  included  in  the  Annex,  we  ask 
experts from among UUST attendees (and others) to 
take part in this expert judgement elicitation. Based 
on the results of this elicitation we aim to publish a 
paper in the peer-reviewed literature. 
   
1. Introduction 
On  16  February  2005  the  Autosub2  AUV  was  lost 
beneath 250 m of ice, some 15 km from the seaward 
edge  of  the  Fimbulisen  ice  shelf  in  Antarctica 
(Nicholls et al., 2006). The subsequent formal Loss 
Inquiry  made  a  series  of  recommendations  (Strutt, 
2006).  Two  key  recommendations  were  that  a  risk 
management strategy, tuned to the needs of an AUV 
group,  should  be  developed,  and  that  reliability 
analyses should be undertaken prior to future Autosub 
campaigns. With Autosub3 now in service, and with 
scientists  funded  for  research  that  would  take  the 
vehicle  to  Antarctica  -  under  an  ice  shelf  -  it  is  
 
 
imperative  that a  Risk  Management Process (RMP) 
suitable  for  AUV  operations  in  hazardous 
environments  be  developed,  tested,  and  applied. 
Moreover, we recognise that under ice is not the only 
hazardous  environment,  for  example,  operations  in 
coastal waters, with attendant shipping traffic, shoals, 
the shoreline and environmental factors such as fog, 
also  present  challenging  hazards  for  safe  and 
successful AUV operation. Therefore for an RMP to 
be useful it should be capable of addressing risk in 
varied operating environments. 
A draft RMP-AUV has been designed along the 
lines outlined in Strutt (2006). Embedded within the 
RMP-AUV is a mechanism for the responsible owner 
to make decisions on the acceptable risk of proposed 
AUV  campaigns  (Trembanis  and  Griffiths,  2006; 
Griffiths and Trembanis, 2007).  The process assists 
the  owner  in  reaching  a  decision  by  deriving  a 
quantitative  estimate  of  the  acceptable  risk  of  loss 
based purely on financial considerations that include: 
vehicle  capital  and  operating  costs,  use  to  date 
(depreciation)  and  appetite  for  risk.  Against  this 
acceptable risk of loss the owner needs to compare 
the likely risk of loss for the vehicle on the proposed 
campaign.  This  risk  comes  from  the  operating 
environment (e.g. open water, coastal, under sea ice, 
under  shelf  ice)  and  from  the  consequence  of 
faults/incidents with the vehicle. 
There  are  difficulties  in  providing  quantitative 
estimates  for  both  these  factors.  Arriving  at 
quantitative estimates of these factors is an example 
of  problems  termed  ‘trans-scientific’  by  Weinberg 
(1972)
1,  in  that  the  problems  can  be  stated  in 
scientific terms but, in practice, they cannot be solved 
through  scientific  means  alone.  Risk  from  the 
operating environment is generally poorly understood 
and rarely quantified, although a ranked list of risk 
from the environment could well be agreed – under 
                                                             
1 This is not an easy text to find in the original, see 
http://garfield.library.upenn.edu/classics1991/A1991GB067
00001.pdf for a commentary.   
 
shelf  ice  is  likely  to  be  the  highest  risk  and  open 
water the least. With the vehicle, there are two major 
issues. First, determining the reliability of the vehicle 
and  second  translating  reliability  into  risk  of  loss. 
Stokey  et  al.  (1999)  tackled  the  reliability  of  early 
Remus vehicles in a qualitative manner. Griffiths et 
al. (2003a, 2003b) and Podder et al. (2004) used a 
statistical  approach  for  Autosub2  and  Dorado 
respectively,  while  Chance  (2003)  plotted  the 
pragmatic quantity ‘availability’ against time for their 
HUGIN AUV. A formalized statistical approach for 
reliability analysis of the ‘Fetch’ class DOERRI AUV 
has  also  recently  been  adopted  and  implemented 
(Trembanis  and  Griffiths,  2006).  Despite  these 
analyses, the statistical approach used with Autosub2 
has been criticised by some for being based on only 
one vehicle. However, we contend that there is merit 
in a  thorough statistical  analysis of the  through-life 
reliability and fault history of a single entity such as 
Autosub.  
The  second  major  issue,  translating  reliability 
estimates into risk of loss, has also been contentious. 
It relies on expert judgement on the significance and 
potential  impact  of  faults  or  incidents,  taking  into 
account  the  operating  environment,  an  assessment 
that  may  be  rife  with  speculative  interpretation.  In 
Griffiths (2003a) for an under sea ice campaign, and 
in Griffiths and Trembanis (2007) for an under shelf 
ice  campaign,  the  assessment  expert  forming  the 
judgement (Griffiths) was closely associated with the 
Autosub development  team. This  is  clearly open  to 
criticism.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the 
engineering trials and the reliability assessment were 
undertaken  as  distinct  and  separate  tasks.  The 
technical  team  prepared  and  conducted  the  trials 
campaigns  and  provided  a  written  report  on  each 
mission. Griffiths performed an initial analysis alone, 
but  refined  his  initial  estimates  through  back  and 
forth  communication  with  the  technical  team. 
Trembanis considers that this approach is a strength 
and  not  a  liability.  However,  the  expert  judgement 
process itself  was only semi-formal, certainly when 
compared to the process characteristics described by 
Otway  and  von  Winterfeldt  (1992)  and  outlined  in 
sections 2 and 3 below.  
As  a  response  to  these  criticisms,  in  this  paper, 
our aims are: 
(a)  To  use  a  more  formal  approach  to  eliciting 
expert opinion on the risk of loss of Autosub3 
in different operating environments. 
(b)  To widen the pool of expert opinion brought 
to bear on this subject. 
(c)  To engage with the AUV community on the 
usefulness  of  eliciting  expert  judgement  in 
risk management. 
There is an extensive literature on eliciting expert 
judgement (e.g. O’Hagan et al. (2006) and its 39 page 
bibliography). A substantial body of work on eliciting 
expert judgement arose from major studies on nuclear 
reactor safety after the Three Mile Island accident and 
other  events  in  the  United  States  in  the  1980s 
(Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1991; Otway and von 
Winterfeldt,  1992).  More  recently,  O’Hagan  et  al. 
(2006) give examples of expert elicitation in medicine 
(e.g. diagnosis and treatment decisions, clinical trials, 
survival analysis), veterinary science, agriculture (e.g. 
crop  yields),  meteorology  (e.g.  severe  weather 
conditions), business studies, economics and finance 
(e.g. outcomes of organisational change, error rate in 
auditing),  engineering  (e.g.  structural  safety).  One 
particularly  good  engineering  example  is  that  of 
eliciting beliefs on the maintenance needs and costs 
associated with water treatment plants. 
In this paper we will take ideas from the expert 
judgement  literature  and  adapt  them  to  use  with 
AUVs. Our approach is to ask a wide range of experts 
from  the  AUV  community  (at  UUST  2007  and 
elsewhere),  with  a  diversity  of  backgrounds  and 
opinions,  to  receive  a  degree  of  training  in  expert 
elicitation  (this  paper,  its  references  and  the 
associated presentation) and to complete a pro forma 
questionnaire (Annex A). This questionnaire includes 
a list of all faults and incidents with Autosub3 to date 
as the input data and asks the experts to (a) assess 
probabilities of the faults/incidents leading to loss in 
different  environments  and  (b)  to  assess  their  own 
level of confidence in making each assessment. It is 
our  intention  to  use  the  experts’  assessments, 
anonymously  and  aggregated,  as  the  basis  for  a 
journal  paper.  We  welcome  feedback  on  the 
usefulness  of  this  approach  and  on  what  should  be 
included for the journal paper.  
 
2. Expert Judgement 
2.1 Background/Types of approach 
“Engineering judgement is often applied to bridge the 
gap between hard technical evidence … and unknown 
characteristics of a technical system”  
Cooke and Goossens (2004). 
 
Intuition  and  judgement  permeate  all  scientific  and 
engineering analysis from very basic decisions such 
as  what  to  study  and  what  techniques  to  adopt  to 
more  complicated  assessments  such  as  safety  and 
forecasting  (see  Otway  and  von  Winterfeldt,  1992 
and O’Hagan et al., 2006). One approach to dealing 
with inherent complexity and uncertainty is through 
the utilization of expert judgement. Expert judgement 
is  a  process  by  which  the  opinions  of  experts  are  
 
brought to bear on issues that involve some measure 
of  science/engineering  and  policy.  In  basic  terms, 
expert  judgement  is  any  process  in  which  one 
undertakes consultation with one or more experts that 
have experience with similar projects to your own.  
Expert  judgements  can,  and  routinely  are, 
employed in a host of varying manners, from round 
table discussions (Sachman, 1974) to more formalised 
forecast  assessments  such  as  the  Delphi  Method 
(Linstone  and  Turoff,  2002).  There  is  an  extensive 
body of literature regarding expert judgement and the 
curious reader is directed to the work by Otway and 
von Winterfeldt (1992) (and references therein) as a 
well-written introduction to the topic. 
Expert  judgement  requires  the  synthesis  of 
opinions  of  experts  in  a  subject  where  there  is 
uncertainty due to insufficient data, when such data is 
unattainable because of physical constraints or lack of 
resources (Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1992; O’Hagan 
et al., 2006). Expert judgement or expert elicitation is 
essentially  a  scientific  consensus  methodology. 
Expert  judgement  is  often  used  in  the  study  of  rare 
and/or highly controversial events. Expert elicitation 
allows  one  to  parameterize  and  quantify  the 
uncertainty as an ‘educated guess’, for the topic under 
study. 
2.2 Process- steps 1-7 
In  their  1992  paper,  Otway  and  von  Winterfeldt 
enumerate  seven  stages  to  the  process  of  expert 
judgement. In the following section we outline briefly 
each  step  of  the  process  we  intend  to  follow  in 
application  of  this  project.  Note  that  although  each 
stage is described, by the very nature of our paper, 
not all of the stages can be completed until after the 
completion and subsequent analysis of the pro forma 
questionnaires,  in  other  words  the  completion  and 
success of this venture depends on the participation of 
UUST attendees.  
 
3. Applying Expert Judgement 
Elicitation of expert opinion through a questionnaire 
is acknowledged to be more difficult than through a 
face-to-face,  one-on-one  interview,  O’Hagan  et  al. 
(2006: 26). However, by keeping the question to be 
asked  simple,  we  intend  to  avoid  the  pitfalls  of 
potential  misunderstanding.  Asking  for  self-
assessment  on  the  level  of  confidence  for  each 
estimate also reduces the aggregated effect of those 
judgements  where  the  expert  feels  less  certain.  We 
have also tested the questionnaire and the description 
of faults and incidents on three graduate students with 
some knowledge of AUVs (one in the UK and two in 
the US). We have incorporated their feedback on the 
questionnaire. 
3.1 The Issues 
Given  the  set  of  facts  on  faults  and  incidents  with 
Autosub3  throughout  its  life  to  date,  described  in 
Annex A, we seek to predict the probability of loss of 
the  vehicle  in  different  operating  environments.  At 
issue  is how  likely  is  it  that  each fault or incident, 
taken in isolation, but with the expert’s knowledge of 
the  wider  issues,  could  lead  to  loss  in  the  four 
example  environments.  The  actual  question  to  be 
asked of each fault or incident is set out formally in 
section 3.3. 
3.2 Selecting Experts 
For many (but by no means all) of  the  judgements 
asked  for  on  individual  faults  or  incidents  there  is 
likely to be a degree of uncertainty over the response. 
It is here that the experience, background, and insight 
of  the  individual  expert  are  most  important.  As  a 
consequence,  the  success  (or  not)  of  the  elicitation 
process  is  strongly  dependent  on  the  knowledge  of 
the  experts.  Ideally,  according  to  O’Hagan  et  al. 
(2006:27), each expert (a) has specific technical and 
domain  knowledge  (e.g.  closely  involved  in  AUV 
design  or  operations),  (b)  is  able  to  approach  a 
problem  via  formal  principles  (e.g.  through  causal 
reasoning – the analysis of cause and effect), (c) uses 
established strategies (e.g. questioning/reviewing first 
assessments)  and  (d)  relies  more  on  procedural 
knowledge (e.g. relationships and an appreciation of 
what is important) and less on declarative knowledge 
(e.g. facts and simple rules). At the highest level of 
expertise,  there  is  agreement  in  the  literature  that 
judgement is intuitive, with “an automaticity of action 
deriving  from  a  wealth  of  knowledge  and 
experience”,  that  may  typically  take  ten  years  to 
gather (O’Hagan et al., 2006:54). Experts should also 
have  a  realistic  view  of  their  competence  for  each 
particular problem. 
Clemen  and  Winkler  (1985)  examined  the 
precision  and  value  of  information  elicited  from 
dependent  and  independent  sources.  If  the  experts 
within  a  pool  have  limited  diversity  or  a  strong 
dependence  (e.g.  from  one  organisation,  or  all 
academics), they concluded that this would “have a 
serious detrimental effect on the precision and value 
of  the  information”.  Our  aim  is  to  maximise 
independence,  with  experts  from  different 
backgrounds, areas of expertise, nationality etc. 
The  preceding  paragraphs  well  describe  many 
participants at UUST, and it is from such a cohort that 
we seek volunteer experts to take part in this study. 
3.3 Clearly define issues 
One of the key stages in the expert elicitation process 
is the definition of the problem or issue to be judged.  
 
For the purposes of this paper we wish to make the 
stated issue as clear and concise as possible. In the 
course of evaluating each fault log entry, the expert 
respondee is asked to assess the following question, 
“What is the probability of loss of the vehicle in the 
given environment X given fault/incident Y?” 
This  question  is  the  key  yardstick  for  the 
evaluation  process  and  a  strict  and  consistent 
adherence  to  this  question  will  help  to  maintain  a 
level  of  consistency  between  responses  and 
respondees.  It  is  important  also  to  note  that  our 
interest in this matter is with respect to the impact of 
the fault on loss of the vehicle, not, for instance, on 
the impact that the given fault might have on science 
delivery, but rather, will this fault lead to the loss of 
the  vehicle  as  a  complete  system  given  the 
environmental  information  and  one’s  own  expert 
opinion. 
3.4  –  3.5  Training  the  Experts  and  Eliciting 
Judgements 
One  of  the  main  focus  points  of  the  symposium 
presentation will be  to provide brief  training  to the 
attendees  in  the  completion  of  the  pro  forma 
questionnaire in Appendix A. 
The literature of expert elicitation acknowledges 
that the precision of estimates is improved if experts 
have  access  to  independent  information,  to  allow  a 
degree of calibration. We have sought, with limited 
success, such independent information. First, for open 
water and coastal environments Leviathan, a leading 
marine insurance binding authority, have stated that 
they have not paid out on an AUV loss in the last two 
years
2. Second, out of some 150 vehicles produced by 
Hydroid,  and  used  in  open  and  coastal  waters,  and 
under sea ice, we believe that none have been lost
3. 
Third,  through  the  early  stages  of  Seaglider 
development and operations, eight out of the first ten 
vehicles were lost, in environments that ranged from 
open water to areas infested with sea ice; of the next 
twelve built, two were lost as of September 2005
4. 
In  order  to  be  of  most  use  to  the  process  it  is 
important that those who graciously agree to conduct 
the  expert  assessment  complete  the  entire 
questionnaire.  The  questionnaire  is  envisioned,  and 
has been tested, to take approximately 3-4 hours in 
total  although it should be stressed that  there is no 
                                                             
2 Personal communication, Keith Broughton of Leviathan 
with Griffiths, June 2007. 
3 Personal communication, Graham Lester of Hydroid with 
Griffiths, July 2007. This was the case after a REMUS 100 
AUV  ‘lost’  for  10  months  was  recovered  recently, 
essentially intact. 
4 Persoanl communication Charles Eriksen with Griffiths, 
September 2005.  
time constraint for its completion. The fault/incident 
descriptions, it should be noted, are the distillation of 
trials and science missions reports (by Griffiths) and 
thus are by nature  concise. Where our students felt 
the initial draft was too terse, we have expanded the 
fault/incident descriptions. It  is  therefore  left to the 
expert assessment of the respondee to determine the 
impact of the given fault. If for some reason one does 
not  feel  that  sufficient  description  is  available  then 
this can be reflected both the confidence level of the 
probability assessment and the comments after each 
assessment.   
It is also important for the elicitation process that 
we  have  a  clear  sense  of  the  backgrounds  and 
expertise of the respondees, therefore the favour of a 
reply to the section in Appendix A entitled “Expert 
Details” is appreciated. It is not necessary, although 
welcome, for respondees  to  include  their name  and 
contact details, but anonymous responses are in order. 
Those  wishing  to  make  electronic  submissions  are 
invited  to  download  the  MS  Word  file  from 
www.noc.soton.ac.uk/OED/gxg/UUSTRiskPaper.html  or 
to contact either of the authors. 
3.6 Analyzing and Aggregating 
Research has shown that many experts, when asked to 
use the full probability range, tend too often to opt for 
values close to 1 or 0
5, O’Hagan et  al. (2006: 68). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that an expert’s ability 
to  provide  unbiased  estimates  shows  no  correlation 
with  the  expert’s  technical  or  domain  expertise. 
However, if experts are aware that particular types of 
faults  or  incidents  have  led  to  loss,  or  not,  their 
subjective  judgements  may  be  less  biased.  This 
outcome feedback is clearly important, and it argues 
for open dissemination of faults and loss within the 
AUV community. 
Handling  differences  of  opinion  and  a  range  of 
subjective probabilities is easier than identifying bias. 
In  their  review  of  combining  probabilities  from 
experts,  Clemen  and  Winkler  (1999)  describe 
mathematical  and  behavioural  combination 
techniques.  The  Autosub  Loss  Inquiry  used  a 
behavioural approach, requiring the experts gathered 
together  to  interact  and  produce  a  single,  agreed, 
group judgement (Strutt, 2006). This approach is not 
without its problems, including group polarisation (or 
‘group-think’). 
Where  experts  do  not  exchange  information, 
mathematical combining  techniques  are  appropriate. 
While current research considers Bayesian belief nets 
to provide a mathematically defensible, rigorous and 
                                                             
5 Indeed Griffiths et al. (2003a) only considered 1 or 0 as 
possible  outcomes,  while  Griffiths  and  Trembanis  (2007) 
considered only 0, 0.25 or 1.  
 
effective  way  of  combining  judgements  (O’Hagan, 
1998; Sigurdsson et al., 2001), they are challenging to 
implement.  As  a  consequence,  our  initial  approach 
will be to use a simple linear or logarithmic opinion 
pool, Clemen and Winkler (1999): 
where wi is the weight given by expert i (of n) for the 
probability pi (!).  
3.7 Complete analysis and write up 
The complete analysis will document the aggregated 
experts’ judgements on the probabilities of leading to 
loss for each fault and each environment as opinion 
pool means and a measure of spread. Importantly, the 
reasons why experts arrived at their judgements will 
be summarised. Using these sets of probabilities, and 
example AUV campaigns for each environment, we 
will model the overall probability of losing a vehicle 
in each campaign using Kaplan  Meier and  Weibull 
methods  as  used  in  Griffiths  et  al.  (2003a). 
Probabilities of loss will be compared with data from 
independent  sources  (if  available)  for  coastal/open 
water  environments,  and  with  earlier  single-expert 
predictions  in  Griffiths  and  Trembanis  (2007)  for 
under ice. 
At  this  level  of  detail,  which  we  suggest  is 
necessary for this first analysis of AUV faults using 
formal expert elicitation by questionnaire, the results 
will be published as a National Oceanography Centre 
research report and made freely available
6. A journal 
paper  will  be  written  using  distilled  information, 
describing the method and the results. 
 
4. Environments 
We  have  chosen  four  contrasting  environments  as 
examples for this study. They were chosen because 
they  are  well  known  to  us  and  they  represent  both 
common  and  challenging  AUV  operating 
environments. Clearly the method can be applied in 
other settings, such  as near  the seabed,  in complex 
terrain,  or  within  enclosed  environments  such  as 
pipes, cenotes, or lakes. In the following sub-sections 
are  concise  notes  on  key  factors  from  each 
environment that may effect experts’ judgements on 
probability of faults or incidents leading to loss.  
There are some factors that are common to one or 
more  environments.  Perhaps  the  most  significant  is 
the process of launch and recovery, frequently from a 
ship.  Incidents  during  launch  and  recovery  are  not 
uncommon; they can, and have, led to loss or write-
                                                             
6 A pdf will be available via http://eprints.soton.ac.uk  
off. The occurrence and impact of such incidents has 
been sufficiently high that some insurance providers 
have suggested co-insurance, or risk sharing, during 
these  specific  parts  of  a  mission  (Griffiths  et  al., 
2007). 
4.1 Open Water 
Open water,  away from  the  coast and  traffic  lanes, 
where the water depth is less than the crush depth of 
the  vehicle,  forms  a  relatively  benign  operating 
environment. An emergency response of rising to the 
surface, or descending to the seabed, is feasible, and 
from either location telemetry of data and position is 
possible.  Clearly  the  risks  are  higher  if  the  water 
depth exceeds  the  crush depth. While hazards mid-
water  are  few,  on  the  surface  high  winds  and/or 
waves, fog and other vessels may increase risk and 
the consequences of technical failures in navigation 
or  communication  systems.  Operating  close  to  the 
seabed can be hazardous, placing reliance on collision 
avoidance  or  altitude-sensing  hardware,  algorithms 
and software. 
4.2 Coastal 
Coastal  settings,  defined  as  waters  from  the  shelf 
edge (150-200 m water depth) and landward towards 
the  shore,  and  including  inland  waters,  can  be 
challenging locations for AUV operations. While well 
below  crush  depth,  many  challenges  remain.  This 
setting  includes  shipping  lanes  and  bay  mouths  as 
well as the near-shore (just outside of the surf zone), 
and estuaries. Physical hazards in this setting include 
high  density  ship  traffic  comprising,  among  others, 
commercial, military, and personal watercraft; divers 
(recreational  and  commercial)  (Patterson,  Sias,  and 
Gouge,  2001);  engineering  structures  (e.g.  bridges, 
breakwaters, piers, jetties, groins, etc.); fishing gear 
(e.g.  pound  nets,  lobster/crab  pots.  Environmental 
hazards include turbid waters and strong fluid flows 
(currents and waves) that make search and recovery 
problematic.  Coastal  settings  do,  however,  afford  a 
host of launch/recovery options including ships, boat 
ramps, docks and piers, which can be used in tandem 
or switched to mid-mission as conditions require. 
Shallow  depths  and  strong  hydrodynamic  flow 
present  increased  risk  for  collision  and  thus  place 
added  importance  on  collision  avoidance  systems. 
The  rapid  spatial  and  temporal  changes  to 
environmental  conditions  in  coastal  settings  also 
place  a premium on navigation and  communication 
systems. The proximity to logistical centres, however, 
does provide advantages for operational adjustments 
(e.g.  operations  can  be  moved  to  more  benign 
locations and additional support supplies can be more 
readily acquired). 
! 
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For  the  purposes  of  the  questionnaire,  we  ask 
experts  to  consider  a  semi-open,  highly  developed 
coastal embayment with depths of 40 m maximally, 
relatively  sheltered  from  waves  but  subject  to  tidal 
currents  of  ~1-1.5  m.s
-1.  Vessel  traffic  includes 
commercial  and  recreational  vessels  and  occasional 
personal watercraft. 
4.3 Sea ice and icebergs 
Sea ice and icebergs pose a wide spectrum of risk that 
merits  an  expert  elicitation  study  in  its  own  right. 
There are numerous classes or types of sea ice, and 
each may pose a threat of some magnitude to AUV 
operations.  Ice  types  are  described  by  Wadhams 
(2000),  and  MacDonald  (1969)  described  how  ice 
affects vessel operations.  More specific information 
on ice  types  and their effect on AUV operations is 
available on the Polar AUV Guide website
7.  
Sea  ice  and  icebergs  pose  a  hazard  to  AUV 
operations for several reasons: 
•  Ice can form a rigid lid to the ocean, hampering 
or  even  preventing  recovery  after  a  technical 
failure or incident. 
•  Afloat, deep ice keels and icebergs pose collision 
hazards. If in shallow water, especially if they are 
grounded,  ice  keels  and  icebergs  may  test 
severely  the  collision  avoidance  and  path 
planning systems within an AUV. 
•  Thin  ice  may  pose  different  hazards:  semi-
transparent  grease  ice  may  be  sufficient  to 
hamper visual sighting on recovery; nilas, up to 
10  cm  thick,  may  damage  appendages  such  as 
antennas. 
•  Continuous  multiyear  ice,  such  as  fast  ice  or 
sikussak can form a barrier as effective as an ice 
shelf (see  section 4.4) should an  AUV become 
stranded,  especially  if  the  support  vessel  has 
limited icebreaking capability. 
•  Ice need not be continuous to pose a threat; brash 
ice can be a hazard during launch and recovery, 
especially to appendages and propeller blades. 
An  important  factor  affecting  the  level  of  risk 
posed by sea ice is the icebreaking capability of the 
support vessel as this affects the likelihood of success 
or  failure  should  recovery  from  under  ice  become 
necessary.  The  risk  appetite  and  time  allocated  for 
search  and  recovery  are  also  factors,  as  are  the 
availability of supporting tools such as an emergency 
location beacon on the vehicle and whether an ROV 
is on board the vessel to aid recovery. 
Because  of  the  wide  range  of  risks,  for  the 
purpose of this study, we ask that experts focus on a 
scenario  where  first  year  ice  dominates  (0.3–2.0m 
                                                             
7 www.srcf.ucam.org/polarauvguide/environment/icetypes.php  
thick), with ice keels to 15m, and sporadic icebergs 
and a support vessel able to break 2 m ice at 2kt. 
4.4. Shelf Ice 
Ice shelves are the floating edges of continental ice 
sheets, and, with a typical thickness of 180 m at the 
seaward  edge,  form  an  impenetrable  barrier.  If  an 
AUV becomes stranded under an ice shelf through a 
fault  or  incident,  the  chance  of  recovery  must  be 
almost zero. An ROV recovery might be possible if 
the stranding was no more than a few hundred metres 
from the ice front. Further in,  it  is possible to drill 
through the ice (e.g. using hot water), and if the AUV 
position  is  known  accurately  a  recovery  might  be 
possible.  However,  such  operations  are  very  costly 
and involve complex logistics. 
Experts  should  bear  in  mind,  as  outcome 
feedback, that only two AUVs have ever attempted 
under ice shelf missions, and both were lost, one on 
its  first  such  mission,  the  other  (Autosub2)  on  its 
second. 
 
5. Completing the Questionnaire 
5.1 Guidelines to completing the questionnaire 
Experts  are  asked  to  adhere  to  the  following 
guidelines in completing the pro forma questionnaire: 
•  Plan to allot between 2-4 hours for completion of 
the questionnaire. There is no time limit; this is 
merely a suggestion for planning purposes.  
•  Please remember to include a confidence index 
on  your  response  to  each  fault/incident. 
Confidence  indices  range  between  1-5  with  1 
being a low level of confidence in the assessment 
and 5 being a high level of confidence. 
•  Remember  to  assess  the  fault/incident  with 
respect  to  probability  of  loss  of  the  asset 
(vehicle) not simply as a subsystem fault or lack 
of data delivery etc. 
Note  that  the  probability  estimate  is  left  to  the 
discretion of the respondee with the caveat that values 
are  within  the  natural  range  of  zero  and  unity. 
Examples of probability responses are: 1/10 (e.g. the 
given fault is likely to lead to the loss of the vehicle 
in 1 out of every 10 missions); 1/100 (e.g. the given 
fault is likely to lead to the loss of the vehicle in 1 out 
of every 100 missions) and so on. Either fractional or 
decimal probabilities are acceptable responses. 
 
 
  
 
 
Estimated probability of leading to 
loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level (1 to 5) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No.  Dist 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description  Open  Coast  Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.001  0.003  0.1  0.7  186  34  A software bug that 
manifested itself seven hours 
after launch (and 34km 
travelled) meant that the 
vehicle was stuck in an oval 
pattern (125 by 75m) at its 
correct operating depth. The 
course angle relative to a 
cardinal direction affected the 
time taken for the fault to 
emerge. 7hr was shortest time. 
4  3  3  4 
Ice Shelf: if occurs, a sure loss, but 
reduced from 1 as required mission 
length may be less than time to fault 
emergence. Under sea ice, rescue 
very possible, but not certain. For 
loss in open water, fault would need 
to be compounded by failure of one 
or more of acoustic beacon-
emergency release-ARGOS on 
surface. Coastal assessed higher as 
extra time on surface exposes to 
higher hazard. 
Table 1. An example of a completed fault/incident entry from mission 186 of Autosub1 during a campaign in the 
open waters of the North Sea in 1999. The vehicle was easily found on this occasion by listening on the RV Scotia 
for its acoustic pinger.  
 
5.2 Example Assessment 
Table 1 shows what we would consider to be a well-
completed  expert  assessment  of  a  real  fault  that 
happened on Autosub1 in the North Sea in 1999. The 
reasons for the assessments call for knowledge of the 
usual  systems  to  be  found  on  an  AUV  rather  than 
necessarily  requiring  detailed  knowledge  of  the 
particular  sub-systems  on  Autosub.  If  general 
knowledge is not adequate in particular cases, then an 
assessment  should  be  attempted,  but  a  lower 
confidence level assigned. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We consider that recording fault histories for AUVs 
is important. It is part of good practice in providing 
immediate  feedback  to  the  operating  teams  on 
performance  and  reliability  and  it  also  leads  to  an 
ability to model statistically the reliability of one or 
more vehicles. 
In previous papers, we have shown how informal 
expert judgement can be used to estimate probability 
of loss from knowledge of the vehicle fault history. 
However,  such  ideas  have  not  been  without 
controversy; as a consequence, in this paper, we have 
set  out  a  more  formal  approach  to  eliciting  expert 
judgement  based  on  widely  accepted  practices 
following a substantial review of the literature. 
Through  presenting  a  full  summary  of  the  fault 
history of the Autosub3 AUV, and an introduction to 
expert  judgement elicitation, our aim is to obtain a 
broad-based expert assessment of the probability of 
loss  of  the  vehicle  in  different  operating 
environments. As an academic exercise, the process 
and  our  findings  will  form  the  basis  of  a  journal 
paper. More practically, returns from experts will be 
used within the existing Risk Management Process –
AUV to better inform the Director NOCS as to the 
likely risk of loss in sending Autosub3 beneath ice. 
Results  will  also  inform  the  technical  team  as  to 
which  faults/incidents  a  wide  cohort  of  experts 
consider most likely to lead to loss, and hence which 
areas need to be given priority. 
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ANNEX A – THE FULL RANGE APPROACH 
A Microsoft Word version of this questionnaire may be obtained from http://www.noc.soton.ac.uk/OED/gxg/UUSTRiskPaper.html  
 
Expert Details 
Name (if willing):            Contact email (if willing): 
Nationality or domicile:            Organisation type: 
Area of Expertise:            Years of experience of AUVs: 
 
Table 1 Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No.  Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description  Open  Coast  Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
        Mission  aborted  (to  surface)  due  to  network  failure. 
(Much)  later  tests  showed  general  problem  with  the 
harnesses (bad crimp joints).          
 
       
384 
 
1.5 
Loop of recovery line came out from storage slot, long 
enough to tangle propeller.          
 
        385  15.2  Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, due  to a 
side  effect  of  the  removal  of  the  upwards-looking 
ADCP.          
 
        386  26  GPS antenna failed at end of mission. 
       
 
        387  27.2  Homing  failed,  and  the  vehicle  headed  off  in  an 
uncontrolled direction. Mission was stopped by acoustic 
command.  Problem  was  due  to  (a)  the  uncalibrated 
receiver  array,  and  (b)  a  network  message  (“homing 
lost”) being lost on the network.  
       
 
 
At this point, you may want to consider what your estimated probabilities of loss arising from each fault or incident would mean for this campaign, which was in 
open water. For each entry, subtract your probability of loss from one, to form probability of survival, then, multiply each together to give the campaign probability 
of survival. Is this overall probability of survival for these faults, in open water, sensible, in your expert judgement? If not, you may want to ‘recalibrate’ your 
judgement on individual faults or incidents and reassess the probabilities.                 
 
Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No.  Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description  Open  Coast  Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
        Aborted  after  4  minutes  post  dive,  due  to  network 
failure. Logger data showed long gaps, up to 60s, across 
all data from all nodes, suggesting logger problem.          
 
       
388 
 
0.5 
Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m oscillation due 
to incorrect configuration gain setting.         
 
        Vehicle went into homing mode, just before dive and 
headed  north.  Vehicle  mission  stopped  by  acoustic 
command. It was fortunate that the ship-side acoustics 
configuration allowed the  ship  to steam at 9kt (faster 
rather than 6kt with the towfish) and catch the AUV.         
 
        Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 minutes, as 
expected.  It  will  continue  on  last-determined  heading 
indefinitely – a Mission Control configuration error.         
 
       
389 
 
3 
Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry receiver 
front end, unrelated to vehicle systems.         
 
        ADCP down range limited to 360m, reduced accuracy 
of navigation.         
 
        GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point of mission. 
          
 
       
391 
 
31 
EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging during mission. 
         
 
        392  32  As consequence of GPS failure on M391, AUV ended 
up 700m N and 250m E of expected end position.         
 
        393  5  Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and no acoustic 
telemetry.         
 
        394  3  Jack-in-the-box recovery float  came out, wrapping its 
line around the propeller, jamming it, and stopping the 
mission.  Caused  severe  problems  in  recovery,  some 
damage  to  upper  rudder  frame,  sub-frame  and  GPS 
antenna. Required boat to be launched.         
                  
 
        395  8  Jack-in-the-box  line  came  out,  wrapped  around  the 
propulsion motor and jammed.         
 
        396  4  Current  estimation  did  not  work,  because  minimum 
time between fixes for current to be estimated had been 
set to 15min; leg time was only 10min. Mission stopped 
and restarted with configurable time set to 5min.         
 
        397  4  Main  lifting  lines  became  loose,  could  have  jammed 
motor.         
 
        398  8  Operators ended mission prematurely, they believed the 
AUV  was  missing  waypoints.  In  fact,  a  couple  of 
waypoints had been positioned incorrectly.          
 
 
 
                  
 
Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No.  Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description  Open  Coast  Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
        Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured as down- 
looking  ADCP  causing  navigation  problems  through 
tracking  sea  surface  as  reference.  This  data  was  very 
noisy and put vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5.         
 
       
401 
 
7.5 
 
Damaged  on  recovery,  “moderately  serious”  to 
sternplane, shaft bent.         
 
        Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 2d 20h into 
mission. Stern plane actuator had flooded.          
 
        Abort due to network failure. Abort release could not 
communicate  with  depth  control  node  for  403s. 
Possibly side-effect of actuator or motor problems.         
 
        Motor  windings  had  resistance  of  330  ohm  to  case. 
Propeller speed dropping off gradually during a dive         
 
        Only  one  position  fix  from  tail  mounted  ARGOS 
transmitter.         
 
       
402 
 
274 
GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 
         
 
        Recovery light line was wrapped around the propeller 
on surface. Flaps covering the main recovery lines (and 
where the light line was towed) were open.          
 
        Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final waypoint. 
         
 
 
403 
 
140 
Propeller  speed  showed  same  problem  as  m402. 
Subsequent  testing  of  motor  with  Megger  showed 
resistance of a few kohm between windings. 
                          
 
 
 
        Pre-launch,  abort  weight  could  not  be  loaded 
successfully  due  to  distorted  keeper.  “If  not  spotted, 
could  have  dropped  out  during  mission”,  considered 
low probability of distortion and not checked.          
 
       
404 
 
75 
Pre-launch,  potential  short  circuit  in  motor  controller 
that could stop motor.         
 
 
        Propeller speed showed same problem as on m402 and 
403.         
 
        CTD  drop-out  of  1  hour  (shorter  drop-outs  noted  in 
previous missions).         
 
        M404 recovery was complicated when lifting lines and 
streaming line became trapped on the rudder (probably 
stuck  on  the  Bolen  where  the  two  were  attached). 
Recovery from the situation required the trapped lifting 
lines grappled astern of the ship, attached to the gantry 
lines, and the caught end cut.         
 
        The  forward  sternplane  was  lost  due  to  lifting  line 
trapping between the fin and its flap on recovery.         
 
       
 
 
 
The  acoustic  telemetry  nose  transducer  was  damaged 
due to collision with the ship.         
 
 
                  
 
Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No.  Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description  Open  Coast  Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
        Fault  found  pre-launch,  LXT  tracking  transducer  had 
leaked water – replaced.          
 
       
405 
 
2.5 
Fault  found  pre-launch,  starboard  lower  rudder  and 
sternplane loose.          
 
        AUV ran slower than expected and speed dropped off 
during mission, due to motor problem. 
       
 
        Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in first part of 
mission.         
 
        Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on recovery on 
windings to case.         
 
        One  battery  pack  out  of  four  showed  intermittent 
connection.         
 
        Acosutci telemetry unit gave no replies. 
         
 
        On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. 
         
 
       
406 
 
104 
Spikes in indicated motor rpm 
       
 
        Acoustic  telemetry  unit  gave  no  replies  at  all  –  no 
tracking or telemetry.         
 
       
407  204 
Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence probe data. 
       
                  
 
 
        Propulsion  motor  felt  rough  when  turned  by  hand  – 
bearings replaced before deployment.         
 
        Aborted  at  50m  due  to  overdepth  as  no  depth  mode 
commanded. Unless compounded by another problem,  
this would show itself immediately on first dive.         
 
        No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit. 
         
 
        Difficulty  stopping  Autosub  on  surface  via  radio 
command. Separate problems with the two WiFi access 
points.         
 
       
408 
 
302.5 
Still spikes on motor rpm that need investigating. 
       
 
                  
 
Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No.  Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description  Open  Coast  Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
        409  1.5  No acoustic telemetry or transponding. LXT ship side 
USBL receiver had leaked during mission giving poor 
bearings to sub, replaced with spare.         
 
        410  9  No acoustic telemetry or transponding. 
         
 
        411  128  No  GPS  fix  at  the  end  of  the  mission.  GPS  antenna 
bulkhead had water inside and had flooded.         
 
        No GPS fix at end of mission. After next mission, GPS 
fixes  started  coming  in  after  vehicle  power  up/power 
down; perhaps problem was due  to  initialisation with 
receiver – and not this time the antenna.         
 
       
412 
 
270 
Problem  at  start  for  holding  pattern.  Holding  pattern 
timed out due to programming mistake.  
       
 
        415  6  Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on rudder 
actuator. Actuator replaced with new one - first use for 
this  new  design  of  actuator  motor  and  gearbox. 
However,  AUV  spent  most  of  mission  “stuck”  going 
around in circles at depth due to rudder actuator fault. 
The new actuator overheated, melting wires internally, 
the motor seized, and internal to the main pressure case, 
the power filter overheated. Some of the damage may 
have been caused by an excessive  current limit (3A); 
correct setting was 0.3A. But this does not explain high 
motor  current.  Possible  damage  during  testing  when 
motor stalled on end stop? Compounded by wiring to 
motor held tightly to case with cable ties, and worse, 
covered with tape (acting as an insulator). Wires were 
not high temperature rated. 
       
 
                  
 
        Three  harness  connectors  failed  due  to  leakage, 
affecting payload systems: EM2000 tube, ADCP_down, 
and  Seabird  CTD.  Despite  connector  problems  the 
system worked without glitches and failed only when 
the power pins had burned completely through on the 
connector feeding power to the abort system         
 
       
415 
 
6 
Although it worked properly at the start of the mission 
at  a  range  of  1200m,  the  acoustic  telemetry  stopped 
working at the end of mission. Hence could not stop the 
mission acoustically when needed.          
 
        416  18  Not  possible  to  communicate  with  vehicle  at  1180m 
depth;  holding  pattern  caused  a  timeout,  and  AUV 
surfaced. Acoustic telemetry max range was 500m for 
digital data. 
       
 
 
        418  15  When  homing  was  stopped  deliberately  after  10  min, 
the AUV did not go into a “stay here” mode. Rather it 
continued  on  the  same  heading;  stopped  by  acoustic 
command  500m  from  shore.  Cause  was  incorrect 
configuration of mission exception for homing. Default 
in  campaign  configuration  script  was  not  set  due  to 
inexperience with new configuration tools.         
 
 
 
 
 
 